The Australian Non-Debate in a Culture of Justification
According to Hobbs and Goldsworthy (1996:xx) , humanitarian aid programs, while important, 'do not fit well with the broader policy which drives die {Australian aid] program and are largely reactive in nature'. In the same vein, the Committee of Review of the Australian Overseas Aid Program (which in 1997 produced the Si mons Report) admits that it was not able to examine in depdi die issues alfecdng 'complex emergencies'. It visited only one emergency setting, a well-established refugee camp on the Kenya-Somalia border. Neverdieless, it characterised emer gency situations by dieir 'complexity, speed and confusion' and recommended dial 'while immediate relief aid is essentially a reactive element of die overall aid pro gram, longer-term rehabilitation support does lend itself to programming, critical assessment and evaluation ... and should be managed in diis way' (Committee of Review of the Australian Overseas Aid Program, 1997:279) . This statement implies diat emergency aid need not undergo die critical assessment and evaluation to which rehabilitation and development programs are subject.
The complexities of providing humanitarian aid are not openly discussed in AusU alia in part because die provision of assistance to underdeveloped or disasterprone countries is not universally believed to be a moral duty or in die interests of Australia. The general public is largely unaware of the economic, moral, political and strategic arguments for and against die provision of aid; and die government aid budget and independent NGO activities must be justified to taxpayers and private donors in terms which will be understood and supported by die average citizen. For example, die AusAID web site shows diat, out of each $100 of government spending, only $1.20 is spent on aid, compared widi, inter alia, $36 on social secu rity and welfare, and $8 on defence; it furdier justifies diis amount by slating diat most of it is spent on goods and services in Australia which are then sent to where diey are needed overseas (AusAID, 1997a) .
Aid agencies are compelled to present dieir activities in a positive light and to highlight die successes, but not die failures, of aid projects. Since die public, upon which aid agencies are so dependent, may stop giving at die slightest suggestion that dieir money is not having die intended effects, failures are downplayed with die ex cuse dial 'at least we tried'. As a senior NGO representative was quoted as saying in Ediiopia, You can't confuse die public widi complex issues. Starving babies and droughts are something people can understand. But trying to explain cor ruption or aid abuses is not going to help our fund-raising and will only hamper our work. (Girardet, 1993:46) Yet aid organisations owe dieir beneficiaries an honest discussion about the dilemmas of humanitarian aid. The Australian government spent A$84m on emer gency relief in 1995/96 (Committee of Review of die Australian Overseas Aid Pro gram Simons Report, 1997:281) . In addition, NGOs raise millions of dollars from die A ustralia public; $30m was raised for die Rwandan crisis alone in 1994 (Committee of Review of the Australian Overseas Aid Program, 1997:284) . The revenue raised and allocated to disasters, although the most visible component of die response to die Australian public, is only die first step; die provision of aid does not automatically lead to die alleviadon ol suflenng. It is only through recognising diat aid can have ambiguous outcomes diat aid organisadons can attempt to mini mise die negadve aspects of dieir work.
'Complex Emergencies' and the Paradoxes of Humanitarian Aid
The provision of aid in an emergency situadon, whedier a natural disaster or die consequence ol war, can result in outcomes which were not originally intended. These are not always negadve, but die paradox of aid lies in die fact diat somedmes aid itself can play a role contrary to diat which is andcipated. The paradoxical con sequences ol aid tend to be heightened in situations of conflict, where aid can be come a stake in war, often widiout the cognisance of aid organisadons. In die past few years, however, European humanitarian agencies in particular have begun to wonder whedier dieir impact in conflict zones is at best marginal or a part of die problem at worst.
1 he language used to describe humanitarian crises, and die emphasis placed on differences in die global environment between die Cold W ar and the post-Cold W ar periods, tend to depict die current dilemmas of humanitarian aid as an un avoidable by-product ol the 'new world order'. 'Complex emergencies' is die fash ionable euphemism for post-Cold W ar humanitarian crises, and accompanies no tions ol chaos , anarchy and 'mindless violence' which 'new barbarism' dieses (Richards, 1996:xiv-vii) like those of Robert Kaplan (1994) espouse. The term 'complex emergency' is designed to associate die multiple causes of disasters widi die multi-faceted direct or indirect consequences, such as large population dis placement, famine, and significant mortality (Burkholder & Toole, 1995 :1012 . I he term has been dirust to die fore of emergency response jargon to reflect die need for a broad and integrated response which, lor die United Nations, requires a system-wide effort (Duffield, 1994:38) .
Fhe complexity of emergencies, however, seems to have more to do widi the response of die multiplicity ol actors in die humanitarian field dian widi differences in die causes ol suffering between the Cold W ar and die post-Cold W ar periods. Humanitarian actors have proliferated gready since 1990 and each aid agency is armed widi a different self-imposed mandate, competing widi odiers for a share of die relief budget. Evaluation reports of emergency operations invariably call for more coordination among agencies in these times of 'complex' problems, a call which is certainly valid. But die causal emphasis is placed on die changed environ ment in which aid is provided rather dian die aid effort itself, and permits aid agen cies to excuse failures in diis 'anarchic' and 'chaotic' context. Furdiermore, diis differentiation of Cold W ar emergencies lrom post-Cold W ar emergencies allows aid organisations to minimise die relevance of die lessons of die past.
While die end ol die Cold W ar altered certain aspects of the provision of aid (elaborated below), die paradoxes of humanitarian action and die causes of suffer-ing remain fundamentally the same. In fact, it was die lack of acknowledgment of die perverse effects of aid, or, in some cases, an overt misuse of die 'humanitarian' nature of aid during die Cold W ar which has hampered an earlier analysis of die paradoxes of aid. A review of die most significant and publicised relief efforts of the last 30 years shows diat aid situadons are invariably complex and pose funda mental dilemmas for aid organisadons. The 1967 declaradon of independence of die province of Biafra from Nigeria, for example, provoked a civil war in which Ni geria blockaded die secessionists' territory, provoking widespread famine. The Ni gerian government restricted aid organisadons' access, and more dian a million people are diought to have perished. W hen aid organisadons gained admittance, die secessionists were facing military defeat. The Biafran insurgents dien used die famine to turn public opinion in dieir favour, and became increasingly intransigent in negotiations widi die government at die expense of dieir own people. The world's first televised famine generated unprecedented sympadiy for die victims of Nigerian oppression and die aid and media networks became a tool in die hands of General Ojukwu.
Similarly, the 1984-85 emergency in Ediiopia was not unicausal, as die opposite of 'complex' implies, but was a result of government policies combined widi drought. As in Nigeria, aid had unintended consequences, inadvertendy supporting die government policy of forced relocation of villagers living in die north. People were attracted by aid to die 'displaced camps' established by humanitarian organisa tions, which became 'relocation camps' for die government. O f 800,000 people moved to marginal land in die soudi, some 200,000 died (Brauman, 1997:xxiii) .
Aldiough die paradoxes of humanitarian aid are not new, die end of die Cold W ar has altered die way in which conflicts are fought and increased die visibility and dius die stakes of humanitarian aid in war. Adherence to state sovereignty has di minished, and external interference in a nation's affairs is defended on humanitar ian grounds: hence die military-humanitarian interventions in northern Iraq, Soma lia, die former Yugoslavia, Haiti and Rwanda. Aid organisations, relegated to refu gee camps on die periphery of conflicts during die Cold War, have since gained access to die heart of conflicts. In these predominandy internal conflicts which are free of die East-West ideological context, combatants have adopted strategies which Jean-Christophe Rufin (1996) calls 'predation' and 'criminalisation' in pursuit of war. lacking patronage from above, belligerents prey on die local inhabitants for sustenance, and make economic resources and infrastructure dieir target. In Libe ria and Sierra Leone, for example, villages are subjected to looting sprees and ter ror, and government and rebel forces fight over diamond mines. Charles Taylor funded die National Patriotic Front of Iiberia for over six years dirough 'criminalisation' practices; widiin only six months of die launch of his offensive in Liberia, his movement had earned over US$3.6m from timber exports to die EC The Guardian, 25 June 1991). Opium in Afghanistan, precious stones in western Cambodia, and gold in Zaire serve die same purpose for rebel facdons.
Humanitarian aid carried into die heart of conflict becomes a target of predadon' and 'criminalisation'; since humanitarian supplies are invariably die larg est external resource arriving in a war zone, control ol aid becomes an objecdve in itself. When convoys are robbed and protecdon payments made to secure roads, vehicles, houses or airports, diis finance sustains die economy of die war. Through establishment ol checkpoints and imposition ol taxes, armed groups can ensure diat their soldiers are fed or paid. In ex-Yugoslavia, the Serbs appropriated some 30 per cent ol aid destined lor Sarajevo; in Mozambique, a tax of $150 per tonne was lev ied on all aid flights to die interior; in Somalia, hundreds of dollars a day were paid for permission to land relief flights at Baidoa airport; and in Iraqi Kurdistan, die official exchange rate imposed on the UN contributed US$250m to die Iraqi budget in 1992 alone (Jean, 1996:568-70) .
Humanitarian aid can become a tool in die control of populations since needy people will move to die site ol aid il possible, and if not, humanitarian aid will try to move to diem. In IJberia, factions held populations hostage, preventing them from .eaving in order to attract aid to dieir region. In Bosnia, humanitarian organisations were caught in a deep dilemma: to bring aid to towns encouraged die occupants to stay, diereby risking their safety at die hands ol the opposition, but to encourage them to leave was to comply widi die objectives of 'edinic cleansing'. In the Rwan dan relugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania, aid direedy empowered the refugee lead ership, many of whom were accused of genocide, by giving diem the reins of die distribution networks dirough which diey exerted control over die refugees, and discouraged repatriation to Rwanda.
Humanitarian aid, dirough die services it brings, can also confer on individuals or regimes in situations of conflict a degree of legitimacy, bodi widi dieir own peo ple and (il die world's media are present) internationally.
But perhaps die most profound paradox of humanitarian aid is die camouflage it can provide to politicians lor their indifference to die causes of die crises diat cre ate die need for humanitarian assistance. Wars are political and need political so lutions. Politicians are reluctant to become directly involved in crises diat do not affect their national interests; but, to appease dieir domestic constituencies, diey need to appear to be addressing die problem. Humanitarian aid allows them to do this. When french President Mitterrand was asked what he was doing to stop the Rwandan genocide, he said diat die government was allocating funds to two hu manitarian aid agencies. I his, and inaction on die part of die international com munity as a whole, prompted Medecins Sans Frontieres to launch a campaign pro claiming diat 'you cannot stop a genocide widi doctors'.
Unless humanitarian organisations become more outspoken and resist allowing themselves to be made substitutes for political action, diey risk becoming accom plices in die deception. Unfortunately, many agencies nowadays are eidier too fi nancially dependent upon governments and die UN to confront die issue, or risk jeopardising their providers of independent revenue if they question die notion that 'something is being done'. The greatest challenge to humanitarian organisations today is to minimise such paradoxes. Yet despite general acknowledgment by agencies of the role refugee camps along die Thai-Cambodian border played in die survival of die Khmer Rouge, the same mistakes were made in the Rwandan refu gee camps of Tanzania and Zaire. Why are die lessons of die past not heeded? Part of the answer may be diat die documents like die Simons Report and die Aus tralian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) Code of Conduct stress die need for accountability to donors and taxpayers, but pay insufficient attention to accountabil ity to the beneficiaries of assistance programs diemselves.
There is no global body to judge whedicr an NGO's activities are appropriate or efficient. It is difficult to envisage a global regulatory agency which embodies the moral standards to which agencies should adhere, or the appropriate way in which aid should be delivered. But at least donor governments should be aware of die wider impact of die aid programs diey finance. They have die power to stop fund ing a project which is detrimental to die beneficiary population, and they can pose questions about die broader impact of a project which may stimulate introspection on w ays in which die negative consequences of aid can be minimised.
Monitoring Australian Humanitarian Aid
According to die Simons Report, emergency assistance 'is die part of die [Australian! overseas aid program diat has die most visibility and receives die most public attention' (Committee of Review of die Australian Overseas Aid Program, 1997:279) . Thus one would assume dial assurances of its effectiveness and appro priateness would be a priority for AusAID. The 1994 Government Review of Hu manitarian Relief Programs, however, admits diat diere is litde field monitoring of die activities supported by AusAID (formerly Australian International Development Assistance Bureau, AIDAB) odier than through die implementing agencies diem selves (AIDAB, 1994:vii) , and concluded diat increased resources need to be de voted to field monitoring of humanitarian relief programs bodi by AusAID stall abroad and in Canberra. But a recent evaluation of die extent to which die 1994 review's suggestions have been adopted by AusAID found diat no additional re sources have been devoted to field monitoring, and diat new administrative proce dures exclude provisions for field monitoring visits. It also found diat die prevailing view in AusAID is diat die Humanitarian Relief (HUR) Section does not have die resources to monitor projects direcdy, and diat it is more effective to monitor die monitoring process established by implementing partners such as NGOs (Broughton, 1996a:7) .
This raises die question whedier such reviews arc merely cosmetic radier dian serving die requirements of transparency and accountability. Whatever die case, die relatively small size of die aid budget necessitates decisions on die cost-benefit analysis of Australian aid, and die establishment of firm priorities. Resources allo cated to monitoring and evaluation processes will divert funds from potential proj ects in die emergency response operation. However, as Peter Urban (1997) argues in a critique of the Simons Report, the aid program needs to include delivery effi ciency in its definition of aid effectiveness, and this is possible only through the es tablishment of a framework through which aid policies can be assessed.
The recent 'NGO reform package' introduced by AusAID (1997b: 137-75), however, is aimed at reducing administrative processes for AusAID officers, by in creasing the responsibility for approved management procedures and financial ac countability to NGOs, at least on paper. NGOs must undergo an accreditation process to show that they can responsibly manage AusAID funds. While this exer cise has assisted NGOs to develop thorough accounting procedures and reporting formats, and has been appreciated by the majority of NGOs (Hunt, 1997) , little at tention is paid to assessment or evaluation of the overall impact of aid projects. 1 he reform audiorises NGOs to evaluate dieir own projects; in effect, if die report ing criteria are sadsfactorily met, AusAID requirements will be fulfilled.
AusAID has delineated two levels of accreditation: 'base level', which entails an NGO appraisal in Australia and for which die ceiling of funding is $100,000; and lull accreditadon , for which a more detailed NGO assessment is required. The HUR secdon has a funding floor ol $150,000, thus necessitadng full accreditadon for access to diis scheme. The full accreditadon procedure consists of diree phases. The first phase is conducted at die desk level and examines die NGO's structure, experience and philosophy, partnership arrangements, links widi die Australian community, and management and financial systems. I he second phase involves an examinadon of die same criteria at die premises of die NGO, based on physical evidence. The diird phase involves a field visit to an overseas program to ensure compliance widi the same criteria on die ground.
While die appraisal of die project management and financial structures of NGOs and their partners is fairly rigorous, very litde emphasis seems to be placed upon die broader aspects of aid. Examinadon of die philosophy of NGOs is lim ited to ensuring that dieir development philosophies are not inconsistent widi die objeedves of die Australian aid program, hence leaving scope for interpretadon. Ethical dimensions of die provision of aid are addressed through die requirement dial NGOs be signatories to die ACEOA Code of Conduct, and formally adopt die provisions dierein. But, as execudve staff of ACEOA will admit, die Code of Con duct itself is oriented towards die rights of donors, not die need of beneficiaries to receive appropriate aid which will not have adverse effects.
Die crux of die ACFOA Code of Conduct is transparency in advertising and financial accoundng, not operadonal aedvides. Although die Code has insdtuted a complaints and compliance process to improve self-reguladon of die aid industry, die culture ol justification is likely to impede all but petty charges from entering the complaints system. In fact, in die year since die Code was adopted, no complaint has been formally lodged (Hunt, 1997) . The repercussions of die allegations against CARE Australia in 1995 affected the entire aid industry; public confidence in NGOs diminished. Perhaps die need for a public show of solidarity explains why members of ACFOA, at the same annual meeting at which they unanimously adopted the Code of Conduct in 1996, welcomed CARE into the ACFOA fold without one question publicly raised as to the status of CARE's efforts to clear its name.
Detailed questions may have been raised in private, but the irony of the situation was not lost on external observers present.
The HUR section of AusAID, however, has moved closer to considering ac countability to beneficiaries as well as donors by obliging NGOs to adhere to the principles specified in the 'Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster relief. This Code is oriented to wards guarding standards of behaviour in emergencies which relate to independ ence, effectiveness and impact. The Code specifies ways in which beneficiary communities should be respected, and includes a clause stating that the negative impacts of humanitarian assistance should be minimised. But, to highlight the need for debate on aid issues, the Code puts the 'humanitarian imperative' first, stating that it is die obligation of humanitarian agencies to provide humanitarian assistance wherever needed. It thus denies the possibility that aid may not always be in the best interests of the recipients. The example of Bosnia mentioned above raises die quesdon as to whedier aid encouraged people to stay in enclaves which were dien attacked by opposing forces. The aid at least gave people die choice of staying or leaving; but are aid organisadons sufficiendy aware of die possible consequences of dieir operadons?
The Code is effecdve in increasing awareness of die principles and ethics to which aid organisadons should adhere. Like die ACFOA Code of Conduct, how ever, it has no independent regulatory body, but is 'enforced by die will of die organisadon accepdng it to maintain die standards laid down in die Code' (IFRC, 1997:144) . The Codes are diereby fraught widi die same limitadons as intemadonal law; states sign and radfy treades and convendons, but cannot be made to observe diem. Heads of agencies may agree diat dieir organisadon will adhere to die prin ciples established, but diis does not obviate die need for scrudny by donors. The clear standards of operadons contained in die Code provide benchmarks which AusAID could use in assessing die broader aspects of NGO humanitarian aid de livery.
With NGO accreditadon criteria, and AusAID evaluadon criteria as a whole, die measure by which 'effecdve overseas work ... consistent widi die objecdves of die Australian Aid Program' (AusAID, 1997c) is judged raises quesdons. Elfecdveness, according to the Department of Finance and die Auditor-General, is meas ured by die extent to which die program outcomes achieved die stated objecdves (ANAO, 1996:20) . AusAID sets objecdves which can be quite general, or can as tutely direct Australian aid away from problemadc areas: witness die Australian fo cus towards repatriadon and rehabilitation in Rwanda instead of aid to die Rwandan refugee camps. Once individual project objecdves have been approved by AusAID and funding granted, however, the evaluadon of diat project is based upon the ex- tent to which the original project objectives were met. While the evaluation format includes contextual considerations which may have hampered the fulfilment of the project objectives, die overall impact or implications of die project can easily be overlooked. Thus, a project aiming to reduce malnutridon rates in a food deficit area may stadstically meet die objeedves. But die impact that die introduedon of food may have on local prices, and hence on die incentive for farmers to produce food locally, may not be taken into account. Broughton (1996b: 1) found tiiat no humanitarian food aid project has ever been formally evaluated by AusAID, which has relied upon the reports submitted by NGOs and UN agencies.
AusAID's preference for strengthening die desk-level supervision of NGO projects over direct field monitoring seems to be contrary to trends in odier parts of die world. The European Community Humanitarian Office, for example, sent in dividual sectoral specialists to Uberia in 1995 to examine projects. While micromanagement is inappropriate, diese specialists made beneficial contributions to project design and implementation, and provided weight in difficult negotiations widi uncooperative local audiorities and factions. In a different role, it was staff of die Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance of the US Agency for International De velopment who acted as moderators in Somalia between die US troops and NGO personnel. They helped to steer military activities in directions which would com plement radier dian compete with NGO activities, and coordinated regular meet ings among the various actors.
Budgetary constraints necessitating choices between evaluations or field opera tions can be eased dirough collaboration widi odier donors. The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, proposed by die Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, involved contributions from some 18 governments, and was influential in addressing shortcomings of die Rwandan relief effort. Donor governments could replicate diis cooperation, perhaps on a geographical basis, to reduce the cost of sending evaluation teams diroughout the world.
In order to fulfil such roles, however, AusAID staff and consultants need to have legitimacy, and be respected by experienced relief staff beyond controlling the purse-strings of field operations. If AusAID staff are to make sound judgments about die effectiveness and appropriateness of NGO programs, diey need to pos sess the technical, practical and contextual skills with which to advise NGOs of the strengdis and weaknesses of emergency activities. The drought relief program in Papua New Guinea (PNG) will be a good test case, widi AusAID staff on the ground coordinating die Australian relief effort widi local audiorities. They face many obstacles: remote communities separated by mountainous terrain makes die logistics of relief problematic. Aircraft visibility was compromised by smoke from the hush-fires, and transportation along some of die major roads is fraught widi in security. Population statistics are based on die 1990 census which, in addition to being eight years old, is widely believed to be inaccurate. Thus baseline data needed to calculate mortality and morbidity rates, essential to an efficient and effec tive response, are absent According to reports from Australian Defence Force per sonnel, few mechanisms have been organised to ensure die equitable distribution of food off-loaded on to airstrips, and the absence of beneficiary lists means that moni toring and evaluation of die relief deliveries will be extremely difficult. Further more, die inaccessibility of die terrain hinders aid delivery to individual villages, en couraging people to move to delivery sites. Congregadons of people in limited ar eas could increase public health risks associated widi shortages of potable water, lack of sanitary facilides, and die potendal spread of communicable diseases.
The PNG drought response has started before crude mortality rates are at die level used by intemadonal humanitarian organisadons to define an emergency. Thus, compared widi the immediate life-saving response needed for die cholera epidemic in Goma, Zaire, or to die bombardment of Grozny in Chechnya, die early response provides an opportunity to plan and execute a program dioroughly, and incorporate lessons of past operadons. AusAID personnel should also consider that die need for dieir intervention derives from institutional failure in PNG, and 4 plan activities which will avoid prolonging tiiis failure. Similarly, in Bougainville aid organisations have die opportunity to consider ways of working which will sup port local mechanisms and not hinder die peace process. Lessons can be drawn from Afghanistan, Liberia, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia and Rwanda. But are diese experiences noted in AusAID evaluations, or were no such evalua tions conducted?
Conclusion
The aim of tiiis article is to stimulate debate in Australia about die dilemmas of humanitarian aid, and to promote operational approaches which will consider die broad impacts of die provision of emergency assistance. Radier dian fearing diat such a debate would discourage die public from supporting aid activities, it is pos sible diat such honesty would gain sympadiy for aid organisations and individuals who continue to work in disaster zones, and continue to risk dieir lives, in spite of all die difficulties.
There is vast international experience and knowledge of emergency response programs from which lessons can be drawn. Unfortunately, terms like 'complex emergency' serve to mask die historical similarities between die causes of humani tarian emergencies today and diose of die past. This language encourages us to ig nore die lessons of previous operations in allegedly 'simple' times. In reality, it is die omnipresence and multiplicity of aid organisations, responding in a spectrum of specialised sectors, which causes the complexity.
Donors can play a pivotal role in driving die debate about humanitarian aid and encouraging innovative responses to avoid die piffalls so often associated widi aid provision in war. Donors should be encouraging appraisals of die context in which humanitarian aid is provided radier dian focusing on die extent to which individual project objectives are met. AusAID's focus on financial and managerial account ability at die Australian level, however, is unlikely to inspire a debate about account ability to recipients: quite die reverse. The Simons Report emphasised die impor-7 I I -I am indebted to a referee for tiiis point tance of outcomes, and if 'risky' is interpreted from the perspective of beneficiaries rather than from dial of investors, die recommendation is relevant to diis discus sion:
AusAID must refocus on results. Perhaps die single biggest shortcoming in die administration of die aid program is die lack of priority afforded to evaluation. Development assistance is an inherendy risky business. It should not be made riskier still by insufficient rigour in appraising propos als and evaluating results. A more rigorous assessment of results would en able die organisation to learn from its experiences. Evaluation should also be the basis of accountability. (Committee of Review of die Australian Overseas Aid Program, 1997:7)
NGO Codes of Conduct, or an independent NGO ratings agency (Mcl^eod, 1995) are, or could be, useful tools widi which to ensure that NGOs conform to a standard of practice and principles which die aid community and donors expect. It is helpful for die public and donors to see comparisons among agencies on, for ex ample, the share of funds sent direedy to die field as opposed to diat spent on ad ministrative costs. But diis is only die tip of die iceberg; what happens in the field, out of die public eye, is of crucial importance to die populations to whom die pub lic and governments are directing dieir aid.
There are rarely answers to dilemmas posed by situations like diat of providing aid to Bosnian enclaves. But concentrating on die 'humanitarian imperative' to save lives in isolation of die larger political picture can cost more lives in the long run. It is naive to believe diat good intentions are enough to make a difference; agencies have a moral responsibility to ensure diat dieir aid is going to diose for whom it is intended, and does not become a tool of belligerent groups. The only way to work towards diis is to have an open and continuous discussion so diat die next genera tion of aid workers going to the field starts radier dian finishes widi die appropriate analytical tools necessary for working in humanitarian emergencies.
